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Summary
1. Georgia is an exceptional post-Soviet country. Like the Baltic 
states, it has consistently and clearly declared that its aim is 
to shed Russian influence and integrate with the Euro-Atlantic 
structures. No other post-Soviet society has been so firmly pro-
Western as the Georgians. After the Rose Revolution in 2003, 
Georgia decided to go out on a limb, openly opposing Russia 
and entering the path of radical – and effective – pro-Western 
reforms, which until recently seemed irreversible. During 
Mikheil Saakashvili’s rule (2004–2013), Georgia was a centre 
of attention for the West (both the United States and the Euro-
pean Union), whose political and financial involvement in fur-
thering the European project in Georgia was immense.
2. The initial concerns about a likely change of Georgia’s foreign 
policy priorities following the rise to power of the oligarch 
Bidzina Ivanishvili and his coalition the Georgian Dream 
(2012–2013) did not materialise, and, in the internal dimen-
sion, Georgia did not break with the legacy of the Rose Revolu-
tion either. Moreover, the country made a huge leap towards 
closer integration with the West by signing, in June 2014, the 
Association Agreement with the European Union (including 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, DCFTA). In De-
cember 2015 Brussels announced that the EU would abolish vi-
sas for Georgians in 2016. In the aftermath of the NATO sum-
mit in Newport (September 2014), a NATO training centre was 
also opened in Georgia, enabling closer co-operation between 
Tbilisi and the North-Atlantic Alliance. 
3. Nevertheless, for several years Georgia has been experiencing 
processes which may be interpreted as symptoms of a deepen-
ing, multidimensional social and political crisis. They mainly 
concern the internal situation, but have also affected foreign 
policy. Reforms have lost momentum, stagnation has set in, 
and in some areas the situation has begun to revert to the 
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pre-revolution status (including rising crime levels, corrup-
tion and nepotism). The Georgian political system has found 
itself in a serious crisis, while society has become increasingly 
frustrated and apathetic, mainly because people’s standards of 
living have been stagnating. This political and social malaise 
has been breeding Euro-scepticism and disenchantment with 
the West, while pro-Russian forces, openly contesting the for-
eign policy line that Georgia has been pursuing to date and 
calling for a turn towards Russia, have been gaining promi-
nence. The signals coming from the government in this regard 
have also been ambiguous. 
4. The cause of the crisis in which Georgia has found itself con-
cerns the fact that the Georgian Dream lacks a clear vision for 
the country; the ruling group’s internal disparity and opaque 
style of governance have also played a role. Other factors under-
lying the crisis include economic difficulties and the stagnating 
standards of living. However, Georgia’s crisis is also related to 
the worsening geopolitical environment around Georgia, and 
especially the West’s policy towards this particular country 
and the entire post-Soviet area. This policy has been defensive 
and the West’s involvement in the area has been diminishing, 
as evidenced by the fact that countries like Georgia have been 
denied prospects of membership in the Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures and the significance of the Eastern Partnership has been 
waning. Russia’s actions have also been a factor, albeit of a sec-
ondary and lesser importance. Moscow has indeed been pursu-
ing an aggressive policy aimed at reintegrating the post-Soviet 
area (with Ukraine as the most important front), and has been 
using soft power in the relations with Georgia in an effort to 
undermine pro-Western sentiments. While it is not possible for 
Russia to win broad support in Georgia, its policy has contrib-
uted to the negative tendencies there.
5. A country that had been firmly navigating westwards, Geor-
gia has now started drifting and slipping into malaise. This 
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risks reversing what the country has achieved so far in the 
internal dimension, increasing social and political instability 
and triggering a crisis in the pro-Western vector of Tbilisi’s 
foreign policy. While that may not necessarily mean a turn to-
wards Russia, in the present situation it has been easier for 
Moscow to pursue its own interest in the South Caucasus area. 
A collapse of the European project in Georgia would entail 
grave consequences for the country itself and beyond. Such 
a turn would harm the pro-European aspirations of countries 
like Ukraine or Moldova. Should Tbilisi’s pro-Western course 
become reversed or permanently stagnant, that would also 
mean a failure of the West (including the EU), whose politi-
cal and financial involvement in Georgia after 2003 was im-
mense. Finally, it would also mean a failure of the EU’s policy 
and further problems in its immediate neighbourhood. 
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I. GeorGIa between ruSSIa and the weSt: 
the hIStorIcal context
Since Georgia regained independence in 1991, the country has been 
pursuing a pro-Western foreign policy, irrespective of the chang-
ing governments and internal and external circumstances. It had 
declared that its strategic objective was to join the European Union 
and NATO. Pro-Western concepts first surfaced in Georgian po-
litical discourse towards the end of the Soviet era and were closely 
linked with the country’s aspiration to quit the USSR and regain 
independence. This pro-Western course has from the very begin-
ning been the cornerstone of independent Georgia’s foreign policy 
and a fundamental principle of its political conceptions and state-
hood. Underlying this course was not only a calculation of national 
interests, but also the tradition of the independent Democratic 
Georgian Republic which existed in the years 1918–1921 (until the 
Bolshevik aggression as a result of which Georgia was incorporated 
into Soviet Russia), and the deeply held conviction that, in cultural 
and civilizational terms, Georgia belonged in Europe with which 
it shared a common, Christian heritage. Georgia’s pro-European 
sentiment has been organically anti-Russian and has been built in 
opposition to Russia – the Georgians see Russia as an antithesis of 
Europe, despite their own cultural and religious proximity to Rus-
sia (Orthodoxy), which they do not deny, and the many positive his-
torical associations dating back to the Tsarist and Soviet times. The 
dominant Georgian narrative sees Russia with its imperialism as the 
main obstacle on the country’s way to Europe, a threat to its sover-
eignty and territorial integrity, and an epitome of backwardness, 
in contrast to the West, which is associated with progressiveness.
However, the notion that Georgia has been anti-Russian for centu-
ries, which has been promoted in public discourse in Georgia (ap-
parently mainly for external consumption), is not true. Beginning 
in the second half of the 18th century, when Georgian territory first 
came within the orbit of Russian influence, and then throughout 
the 19th century, the dominant sentiment in Georgia was favourable 
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towards Russia and the Russians: Georgia was a loyal province 
(Tbilisi, called Tiflis at that time, was the capital of the Russian 
Caucasus) and Georgian elites participated in the political, eco-
nomic and cultural life of the Romanov empire. At that historical 
juncture the alternative, which the Georgians had experienced for 
centuries, was Turkish and Persian influence, from which Russia 
had helped the Georgians to liberate themselves. The Georgians 
perceived Russia at that time as a European empire and the only 
alternative to the Islamic world. Thus, Russia was seen as a sub-
stitute for Europe, the only accessible centre of civilizational pro-
gress, and the antithesis of “Asian” backwardness and despot-
ism (the Christian Armenians viewed Russia in a similar way). 
Anti-Russian tendencies first surfaced in the period after the 
fall of the Tsars and in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution. 
They were also linked to the emergence of the European alterna-
tive, to which both the Whites and the Bolsheviks posed a threat. 
The conquest of the Democratic Georgian Republic by Bolshevik 
Russia (1921), the emigration of political elites and the establish-
ment of Soviet Georgia put an end to the hopes for independence. 
In the years that followed, Georgians gradually came to terms 
with the Soviet state (a process in which repression also played 
a role), and then came to identify with the Soviet Union, as a re-
sult of which there were no anti-Russian sentiments (nb., the 
fact that most Georgians have a positive attitude towards Stalin 
stems from their strong identification with the USSR). This was 
not merely a consequence of the absence of a political alternative 
and Soviet society’s isolation from the external world. Georgia 
and its people benefited from the Soviet system. In the political 
dimension, Georgia was a separate republic governed by a local 
party nomenklatura, with Georgian as the official language. Its 
territory included a number of territories also claimed by Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan,1 as well as Abkhazia, whose elites aspired 
1 Including the Armenian-populated Javakheti or the Azeri-populated Kvemo-
Kartli. The fact that there are large Armenian and Azeri minorities in Geor-
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to the status of a Soviet Union member in its own right.2 Other 
important factors that contributed to Georgia’s successful inte-
gration with the Soviet Union concerned universal service in the 
Soviet army and a human resources policy that offered promo-
tion opportunities to non-Russians, too. While the capture of 
Georgia by the Bolsheviks meant repression for many members 
of the intelligentsia and the aristocracy, the Soviet era brought 
civilizational advancement for the majority of the population. 
The Georgians also appreciated the economic stability, which 
became particularly noticeable in the 1960s, and their standards 
of living, which were higher than in many other republics. This 
helped to erode the memories of the repression of the 1920s and 
1930s and overshadowed the negative impact of the attempts at 
imposing Russian as the official language in the Georgian SSR 
(1978).3 
A radical change of attitudes towards Russia came with the new 
developments in the region: the process of perestroika, the emer-
gence of the Georgian independence movement (whose orientation 
was anti-Russian), the breakup of the USSR and the emergence 
of the Western alternative, as well as the loss of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (to which Moscow actively contributed by support-
ing the separatists). The rise of anti-Russian sentiments was also 
fuelled by an event which has since become symbolic: the brutal 
crushing of an independence demonstration in Tbilisi on 9 April 
1989 by Soviet soldiers, in which at least 19 people were killed. It 
is characteristic, though, that the aversion to Russia, which was 
gia while Armenia and Azerbaijan have no Georgian minorities (except for 
a handful of villages in Azerbaijan) demonstrates that Soviet decisions con-
cerning territorial divisions were favourable to the Georgian SSR).
2 In the years 1921–1931 Abkhazia was a separate Soviet republic (the Abkhaz-
ian SSR). However, in 1931 it was incorporated into the Georgian SSR as the 
Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Republic.
3 Throughout the Soviet period, local languages (written in the Georgian and 
Armenian script, respectively) were the only official languages in the Geor-
gian SSR and the Armenian SSR. In the other republics Russian was an of-
ficial language alongside the local languages.
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widespread in Georgia, did not transform into a common aversion 
to the Russian people or Russian language and culture. 
Over the last twenty-five years, Georgians have been very con-
sistent in their societal civilizational and political choices. While 
there have always been pro-Russian politicians and political 
groups on the Georgian political scene, they have always been 
marginal. It would be difficult to discuss pro-Western leanings 
in the case of the first Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhur-
dia (1991–1992) because he was focused on the internal situation 
(keeping power, countering separatism, promoting Georgian na-
tionalism), while making efforts to obtain recognition of Geor-
gia’s independence by other countries. However, his policy was 
certainly anti-Russian. Eduard Shevardnadze (1992–2003), who 
had served as the Soviet minister of foreign affairs in the years 
1985–1990, was the first Georgian leader to develop contacts with 
the West, although he also strove to take Russia’s interests into 
account (for instance he had to make Georgia a member of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States). It was during his term 
that Georgia first took steps with a view to building pipelines to 
transport Caspian energy resources via Georgian territory while 
bypassing Russia (the Baku–Supsa oil pipeline was built in 1999, 
and the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline 
started in 2002). Georgia was also one of the founding members of 
the anti-Russian GUAM organisation (1997)4 and started military 
co-operation with the United States (US military advisers arrived 
in Georgian in 2001). Under the rule of the United National Move-
ment (UNM) of Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia started pursuing 
an uncompromisingly pro-Western policy: it launched a program 
of radical internal reforms, declared that it would seek member-
ship in the Euro-Atlantic structures and openly challenged Rus-
sia. When the Georgian Dream won the parliamentary elections 
4 The Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development was established in 
1997. Its founding members included Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, 
hence the acronym GUAM. In 1999 Uzbekistan joined the organisation, but it 
withdrew in 2005 (in 1999–2005 the organisation was called GUUAM).
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in 2012 it continued along the pro-Western course, and it was un-
der Giorgi Margvelashvili, the Georgian Dream president elected 
a year later, that Georgia signed the Association Agreement with 
the European Union (June 2014). 
The pro-Western course enjoys massive popular backing in Geor-
gia because it is based on social consensus (most Georgians are in 
favour of joining the EU and NATO5). However, it should be noted 
that while this is clearly a dominant attitude among the elites, the 
wider public is more likely to cherish friendly attitudes towards 
Russia and a Soviet nostalgia. This is due mainly to the growing 
disenchantment with the West related to the stagnating stand-
ards of living in recent years and the hopes that improving rela-
tions with Russia could bring some positive change in this regard. 
5 According to public opinion polls conducted in April 2015 by the US Natio - 
nal Democratic Institute (NDI) 68% of Georgians were in favour of joining 
the EU and 65% were in favour of joining NATO; http://www.civil.ge/files/
files/2015/NDI-Poll-April2015.pdf 
A poll conducted by the same institution in November 2015 showed that 69% 
of respondents were in favour of integration with NATO and 58% were in 
favour of integration with the EU; https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Win-
ter%20poll_2015_Public%20presentation_ENG_version%20FINAL_0.pdf
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II. the SucceSSeS of GeorGIa’S weStward 
courSe
1. Saakashvili’s reforms
Until the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia’s pro-Western decla-
rations seemed to be political fiction. Georgia was a failed state 
ridden by corruption, whose government was unable to fulfil its 
basic functions or control its territory, and was struggling with 
unresolved separatist conflicts (in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) 
and enormous crime levels. When Saakashvili’s team came to 
power, the situation changed radically. At that time Georgia un-
dertook the most courageous, effective and momentous reform 
experiment in the entire post-Soviet area (except for what hap-
pened in the Baltic states), buttressed by huge political, financial 
and expert backing from the West (especially the United States, 
the country that became the patron of Saakashvili’s reforms) and 
effective co-operation between Georgia and the West.
The reforms implemented in the years 2003–2012 were not so 
much about democratisation as modernisation, because of the 
nature of challenges facing the Georgian leadership at that time. 
The main problem was not lack of democracy (Georgia under She-
vardnadze was not an authoritarian state), but rather the dys-
function of the state and the disastrous economic situation. Thus, 
Saakashvili decided to base his political programme on three pil-
lars: reconstruction of state institutions (including the army), 
economic liberalisation, and measures to improve Georgia’s inter-
national image. These were put into practice, under Saakashvili’s 
leadership, by a strongly ideologically motivated, tight-knit team 
of reformers who deeply believed in the justness of their mission, 
and many of whom had lived in Western states for longer periods.
As part of the first pillar, reforms were implemented in the po-
lice (the traffic police force was disbanded, thousands of func-
tionaries were replaced by new hires, and salaries were increased 
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several-fold), the army (with substantial support from the United 
States6) and in other enforcement bodies. The government unre-
lentingly fought corruption and organised crime (the most influ-
ential mafia leaders were either imprisoned or forced to leave the 
country7), the civil service was staffed with new people, function-
ality was restored to the administration, the quality of public ser-
vices improved considerably and the state started to regularly pay 
out salaries, pensions and disability allowances. Renovation of 
the crumbling infrastructure commenced (including roads, rail-
ways, public buildings and energy grids). The central government 
also regained control of those regions which were only loosely 
controlled under Shevardnadze (Ajaria, Samtskhe-Javakheti). 
Finally, Georgia managed to end its dependence on Russian gas 
supplies as it started buying gas from Azerbaijan. 
Equally important were the liberal economic reforms, which 
were closer to the American model than to European solutions.8 
The most important ones included repairing the tax system (sub-
stantially lower taxes and more effective tax collection), deregu-
lation (slashing the number of licences and permits required to 
do business), mass privatisation of state assets, adoption of a lib-
eral labour code,9 and measures to attract foreign investments 
6 The participation of Georgian soldiers in operations in Iraq (as part of mili-
tary co-operation with the US) and in Afghanistan (as part of NATO’s mis-
sion) was an important element of the modernisation and efforts to build 
closer co-operation between the Georgian army and the USA/NATO.
7 Mostly to Europe (France, Spain, Italy) and Russia. Massive imprisonments 
of criminals and people with links to criminal circles were possible thanks to 
the adoption of unique anti-mafia rules into the criminal code, under which 
the very fact of belonging to such a fraternities was criminalised.
8 The reforms were developed by the economy minister Kakha Bendukidze, 
an advocate of an ultra-liberal economic model.
9 The labour code adopted in 2006 was one of the most liberal in the world. 
It only regulated workers’ minimum age (16 years), weekly working time 
(41 hours) and leave rights (24 days a year). All the remaining questions (in-
cluding the type and terms of labour contracts) could be freely agreed be-
tween the employer and the employee. Facing international criticism, the 
code was amended in 2013.
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(facilitations for investors, allowing foreign operators to buy land 
in Georgia, abolition of visas for nationals of most states), which 
propelled economic development. The economic reforms imple-
mented after 2003 were so courageous that they came to be known 
as the “Georgian model of liberalisation”. 
Creating a positive international image of Georgia was also an 
important element of Saakashvili’s’ strategy – the objective was 
to attract support from the West and bring investors and tourists 
to the country. In part, Georgia owed its new recognisability to 
the figure of its president, a charismatic leader whose actions and 
statements were all over the world media. However, a number of 
government projects also contributed to boosting the country’s 
image (including the promotion of Georgia in Western media, the 
renovation of buildings or the – often extravagant – investment 
projects in Batumi, Tbilisi, Mtskheta and other cities).
While Saakashvili’s rule was marred by a number of negative 
elements (including authoritarian methods; see the chapter on 
“Chronic problems with democracy”, p. 22, for more information) 
its bottom line was certainly positive. The state started function-
ing again and regained its authority in the eyes of the people. The 
economy boomed as a result of the internal liberalisation and 
the influx of foreign investments, recording economic growth of 
around 10% in GDP in 2005.10 Georgia’s international image im-
proved considerably, as evidenced by its surge in the rankings of 
international organisations. In 2006 and 2008 the World Bank 
awarded Georgia the prestigious title of the world’s leading eco-
nomic reformer, and in 2010 the country ranked 11th in the “Do-
ing Business” report (up from position 112 in 2005). Georgia also 
advanced from position 113 to positon 34 in the economic freedom 
ranking by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal in 
10 In 2002 Georgia’s GDP increased by 5.5%, followed by 11.1% in 2003, 5.9% in 
2004, 9.6% in 2005, 9.35 in 2006, and 12.4% in 2007. In the same period (2003-
2007) accumulated economic growth reached around 110%; figures of www.
geostat.ge
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2012, and climbed from position 124 to position 52 in Transparency 
International’s ranking in the same period. The influx of foreign 
investment11 and international tourists12 was a tangible measure 
of the improvement in Georgia’s international image.
2. the Georgian dream continues the pro-western 
course
The change of government that occurred in the years 2012–2013 was 
the first one in Georgia’s post-Soviet history that took place through 
democratic elections. While the firm position of the West and con-
cerns about its possible criticism did contribute to the fact that the 
transfer of power occurred democratically and Saakashvili’s team 
did not contest the election result, the ballot was nonetheless a suc-
cessfully passed test for Georgia and a strong proof that pro-West-
ern sentiments were deeply rooted in both political camps.
Despite the initial fears, Georgia’s foreign and internal policy pri-
orities did not change after the Georgian Dream movement rose 
to power. In the external dimension, continued rapprochement 
with the West and Euro-Atlantic aspirations remained a priority 
(although since the Russian-Georgian war, the vector of Georgia’s 
foreign policy had shifted away from the United States towards 
Europe). Thanks to the Eastern Partnership programme initiated 
in 2009, Tbilisi was able to institutionalise its co-operation with 
the European Union, an ambition that materialised in June 2014 
with the signature of the Association Agreement and the DCFTA.13 
11 In 2005 Georgia received US$ 449 million in FDI, followed by US$ 1.19 billion 
in 2006 and US$ 2.014 billion in 2007. In the years that followed, the volume 
of FDI decreased – to US$ 1.56 billion in 2008 and US$ 658 million in 2009; 
http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=140&lang=eng
12 298 thousand international tourists visited Georgia in 2002, by 2005 this 
number had increased to 560 thousand to rise again to 1.05 million in 2007, 
2.03 million in 2010 and 5.3 million in 2013; http://data.worldbank.org/indica-
tor/ST.INT.ARVL
13 Both entered into force already in September 2014. The ratification process 
by the EU national parliaments was completed in December 2015.
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Negotiations are also underway to exempt Georgian nationals 
from the EU visa regime, which will most likely take place in 
2016.14 Finally, the European Union Monitoring Mission in Geor-
gia (EUMM), which was established after the war in 2008, is still 
operating in Georgia and monitoring compliance with the agree-
ment, negotiated by Brussels (or in fact by France, then holding 
the EU presidency), which ended the Russian-Georgian war.15
The Georgian Dream government has continued to co-operate 
with NATO, and has repeatedly declared that Tbilisi’s objective 
was to join the Alliance. The tangible manifestations of this co-
-operation included further involvement of Georgian troops in 
the NATO operation in Afghanistan and the launch of the NATO–
Georgia Training Centre in w Krtsanisi near Tbilisi (August 2015).16 
Despite its negative attitude towards the previous government, 
also in the internal dimension, the Georgian Dream coalition has 
not rejected the legacy of the Rose Revolution. While the reforms 
have lost some of their momentum, they are continuing. In some 
cases, reforms are also being implemented in areas which drew 
criticism from the West during Saakashvili’s rule (e.g. the Interi-
or Ministry, the Prosecutor’s Office, healthcare). Observers of the 
Georgian political scene have been emphasising that the country 
14 On 18 December 2015 the European Commission recommended abolishing 
the visa regime for the nationals of Georgia and Ukraine as both countries 
had met the conditions set by the European Union; http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-15-6368_en.htm
15 The EUMM has a permanent staff of 205 delegated officials from the EU coun-
tries, including 30 persons from Romania, 21 from Poland and Sweden each, 
and 17 from the Czech Republic, according to 2015 figures. In the same year 
the mission had a budget of EUR 18.3 million. Operating from its three bases 
in Mtskheta, Gori and Zugdidi, the mission patrols conflict zones in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia and the adjacent Georgian territories (the Russian side 
is not co-operating with the mission and has denied its representatives access 
to the territory of both regions); http://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/
facts_and_figures
16 The Centre is part of a Georgian army training centre; it is not a separate unit; 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28528
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has also become more democratic and the ‘revolutionary’ model of 
state governance, based on improvisation and arbitrary decisions 
made in a narrow circle, is now a matter of the past. Moreover, 
freedom of the media has improved in the initial period of Ivan-
ishvili’s rule, non-governmental organisations now enjoy more 
freedom and reports of police lawlessness or mistreatment of in-
mates have become much less frequent. 
3. western involvement
The reforms in Georgia would not have been possible without the 
support from and involvement of the West, and especially Wash-
ington and the EU, as well as individual Western states including 
Poland. Neither could they have taken place without the effective 
collaboration between Georgia and the West. Western assistance 
consisted of political and economic-financial support as well as 
expert knowledge, and its scale was such that the West should be 
regarded as Georgia’s patron during that period.
For many years Georgia stood high on the political agenda of the 
West, which directly and unequivocally supported the Georgian 
leadership and its actions, although it was not uncritical and at 
crucial moments, e.g. during the opposition demonstrations 
crushed in 2007 or ahead of the elections in 2012, intervened di-
rectly, persuading the Georgian leadership into taking a specific 
course of action. 
The most significant political measures taken by the West included 
granting Georgia (and Ukraine) NATO membership prospects at 
the Alliance summit in Bucharest (2008); the inclusion of Georgia 
into the European Neighbourhood Policy (2005) and the Eastern 
Partnership (2009), the signature of the Association Agreement 
with the EU (2014), as well as the political involvement of Brussels 
in ending the war with Russia and the deployment of the EUMM 
afterwards. Support for Georgia was expressed through frequent 
visits by Western leaders, including US president George Bush in 
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2005, or presidents Lech Kaczyński of Poland, Viktor Yushchen-
ko of Ukraine and Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania during the war 
with Russia (August 2008). It is significant that the West did not 
withdraw its support for Georgia after the Russian-Georgian war, 
despite its doubts as to who opened fire first and its reluctance to 
confront Russia.17 
Expert and financial support was equally important. According 
to World Bank figures, in the years 2004–2013 Georgia received 
US$ 5.663 billion in Official Development Assistance (the high-
est amounts was transferred in 2009). In the years 2007–2013 the 
European Union provided EUR 452 million under the ENPI pro-
gramme (budget support, communication and energy infrastruc-
ture development, support for the private sector, internally dis-
placed persons, etc.), while the US provided US$ 395 million via 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation (2005–2010). In October 
2008 a conference of donors was held in Brussels, in which the 
participants (USA, EU, EBRD, World Bank and others) adopted 
a package of post-war assistance for Georgia worth US$ 4.5 billion. 
Georgia also benefited from Western assistance in the form of ex-
pert support (which concerned mainly the implementation of re-
forms, adaptation to EU and NATO standards, etc.) and training 
for the civil service and state functionaries. Hundreds of develop-
ment projects have been implemented year after year by Western 
development agencies, embassies and non-governmental organi-
sations (in areas such as infrastructure, regional development, 
17 The special commission appointed by the EU and led by the Swiss diplomat 
Heidi Tagliavini found that the armed operations started with the shelling 
of Tskhinvali by the Georgian army during the night of 7-8 August 2008. 
However, the commission also concluded that those events could not be con-
sidered in isolation from the developments of previous days and weeks, when 
the Russian side and the Ossetian separatists had staged numerous provoca-
tions; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_09_09_iiffmgc_re-
port.pdf 
Saakashvili’s political opponents in Georgia have been accusing him of 
starting the war and of acting on a Russian provocation.
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assistance to disadvantaged social groups, entrepreneurship sup-
port, agriculture support, etc.). 
Security is a particularly important area in which Georgia has 
benefited from Western support (in this case coming mainly from 
the United States). The USA’s flagship projects in this respect in-
cluded: the Georgia Train and Equip Programme (GTEP) initiated 
in 2002 and the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program 
(SSOP; in place since 2005). As part of these programmes, the 
United States has funded reforms in the Georgian army, provided 
equipment and training of soldiers and officers. The involvement 
of Georgian troops in the NATO mission in Afghanistan has also 
been an important element of Western-Georgian military co-op-
eration (the Georgian contribution stands at 11 thousand troops 
so far; the Georgian contingent is currently the mission’s second 
largest after the US force). The same applies to Georgia’s involve-
ment in Iraq. 
4. the impact of Georgia’s reforms on the post-Soviet 
area
The significance of the Georgian reforms is not limited to Georgia 
alone. The Rose Revolution, the first of a series of so-called colour 
revolutions in the post-Soviet area, and the processes that took 
place in its aftermath, provided inspiration and models for other 
post-Soviet states and societies, and demonstrated that countries 
struggling with Soviet legacy could undergo effective transforma-
tions. They paved the way for the Orange Revolution (2004) and the 
Maidan (2013) in Ukraine, the protests against rigged presidential 
elections in Armenia (2008), and the pro-Western reforms in Mol-
dova. They also provided an impulse which led to the inclusion 
of post-Soviet states into the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
the creation of the Eastern Partnership. The current leadership 
of Ukraine has been taking its cues from Georgia’s experiences, 
which proves that this is indeed how Georgia is seen in the post-
Soviet area (the Ukrainians have invited Georgian politicians and 
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officials, including Mikheil Saakashvili himself, who became the 
governor of the Odessa oblast in early 2015, to share their knowl-
edge and help in the implementation of reforms).18
By adopting a firmly pro-Western course, the Georgians took 
a huge risk. Their choice meant an open confrontation with Russia, 
for which Georgia paid a price: it found itself at war with Russia 
in 2008, Moscow then recognised the independence of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia and Georgia lost control of these territories,19 
having previously lost access to the Russian market (in 2006 Rus-
sia imposed an embargo Georgian imports). Georgia was the first 
former Soviet country other than the Baltic states to take such 
a radical course, symbolised by its withdrawal from the Common-
wealth of Independent States in 2009. The other states including 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Kazakhstan for years tried to 
navigate between the West and Russia, a practice first rejected by 
post-Maidan Ukraine, which has decided to stay on its pro-West-
ern course despite the loss of Crimea and the Russian-instigated 
war in Donbas. Georgia’s example and success have been a source 
of inspiration for the Ukrainians in this regard also. 
18 Former Georgian officials currently working in Ukraine also include the 
former minister for health Sandro Kvitashvili (who heads the Ukrainian 
Ministry of Health), the former deputy interior minister Eka Zguladze (who 
now holds an equivalent post in Ukraine) or the former chief of the Georgian 
Police Academy Khatia Dekanoidze (currently serving as chief of the Ukrain-
ian police).
19 Before 2008, the Georgian government controlled the Kodori Gorge in Abkha-
zia and in Ossetia, the separatists had only very loose control of many Geor-
gian-populated villages. In the aftermath of the war operations, the Abkhaz-
ian forces seized Kodori and Ossetia troops took control of Georgian enclaves 
in South Ossetia. This resulted in an exodus of several thousand Georgians 
from the territories in question.
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III. the crISIS
The reforms and successes are only part of the picture, however, 
because from the beginning Georgia also experienced internal 
problems and tensions, stemming mainly from the difficult do-
mestic situation (the Soviet legacy, consequences of the state’s 
disintegration in the 1990s, the rapid pace of radical top-down 
reforms, and the leadership’s arrogance and refusal to take the 
opposition into account), as well as external circumstances (the 
tense relations with Russia). The most serious problems concerned 
undemocratic practices, typical of the Saakashvili period, but also 
present during the rule of Georgian Dream. Nevertheless, those 
problems did not undermine Georgia’s pro-Western course, which 
remained stable. The current situation in Georgia seems to be dif-
ferent, however. Tendencies and phenomena can be observed in 
the country’s social and political life that point to a deepening cri-
sis within the pro-Western approach. The most important ones 
concern changes in foreign policy, stagnating reforms, growing 
disenchantment with the West, increased activity of pro-Russian 
organisations, and symptoms suggesting that Georgia may be re-
verting to the condition in which it was prior to the Rose Revolu-
tion, such as corruption and nepotism. 
1. chronic problems with democracy
Accusations concerning the government’s use of authoritarian 
methods were a staple allegation against Saakashvili’s team. This 
was due to the hierarchy of priorities adopted by the Georgian 
leadership, in which repairing and modernising the country was 
seen as more important than democratisation. The undemocratic 
practices employed by the Georgian government included abuse 
of power by the enforcement bodies (especially the Interior Min-
istry under the leadership of Vano Merabishvili, as well as the 
prison service) which employed drastic and sometimes illegal 
measures against people regarded as a threat to the country’s in-
ternal stability (mainly criminals, but in some cases also political 
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opponents of the regime), as well as massive surveillance. The 
problems mostly affected the overcrowded detention facilities 
and prisons where torture was frequently used. Saakashvili’s 
record was marred by the forceful suppression of an opposition 
demonstration in autumn 2007 and the introduction of state of 
emergency for two weeks.20 The Saakashvili team have also been 
accused of curbing media freedom (e.g. through the temporary 
closing down of the Imedi and Kavkasia televisions in 2007), forc-
ing entrepreneurs to finance the state’s projects, tolerating cor-
ruption in elite circles (e.g. in the form of privileges for entrepre-
neurs with links to the government) and de facto monopolies, and 
not respecting private property (asset confiscation). The fact that 
the courts were not independent and pliant in relations with the 
prosecution was also a major problem. 
The issues described above were also reflected in Georgia’s po-
sition in international rankings (as were the positive effects of 
reforms). For instance, in the US Economist Intelligence Unit De-
mocracy Index, Georgia was described as a hybrid regime with 
strong government control of the media, opaque decision making 
processes and a de facto single-party political system. The author-
itarian tendencies and methods incompatible with democratic 
principles were also criticised by the West, for example in the pe-
riodic EU reports on Georgia’s progress in the context of the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy.
Georgian Dream came to power promising to fight Saakashvili’s 
police state – a pledge that considerably contributed to its success 
at the ballot box (as did the publication of footage showing torture 
in prisons).21 Nonetheless, Ivanishvili’s team has also repeatedly 
resorted to methods that were doubtful from the point of view of 
20 In order to undo the negative consequences of the 2007 political crisis and 
regain democratic legitimacy, Saakashvili stepped down and called an early 
presidential election in January 2008, which he won by a majority of 53%.
21 The scandal related to the footage, which was published shortly before the 
parliamentary elections in 2012, has been dubbed the “Georgian Abu Ghraib”.
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a democratic state, and – like the United National Movement – has 
been criticised for this by the West. The force binding the Geor-
gian Dream coalition together and its main objective had been not 
so much to implement a specific political programme as to oust 
the United National Movement and hold it to account. As a result, 
political revanchism that exploited state institutions and media 
witch-hunts became the driving force of Georgian Dream’s in-
ternal policy. As the most visible manifestation of this tendency, 
numerous politically motivated lawsuits were filed against high-
ranking members of the former leadership (including Saakashvili 
himself, who had to emigrate after an arrest warrant was issued 
against him; in December 2015 the Georgian government stripped 
him of Georgian citizenship after he had assumed Ukrainian citi-
zenship). Some of these lawsuits ended with long imprisonment 
sentences (meted out to the Interior Ministry chief Vano Mera-
bishvili, defence minister Bacho Akhalaia and the mayor of Tbili-
si Gigi Ugulava among others; in total around 100 former officials 
were sued). 
The witch-hunt against the UNM gained momentum in Autumn 
2015. At that time the government took or inspired a number of 
actions targeting the opposition, including the publication of ma-
terials discrediting the previous government (new videos show-
ing inmates being tortured in 2011) and acts of vandalism against 
UNM offices in several cities of Georgia during anti-opposition 
demonstrations (October 2015). The latter acts had been orches-
trated by youth organisations with links to the government. The 
National Security Service of Georgia has also opened an investiga-
tion into the opposition’s alleged plot to carry out a coup, based on 
recordings of Saakashvili’s conversations with UNM politicians.22 
Statements by the then prime minister Irakli Garibashvili, who 
22 In telephone conversations with the member of UNM leadership Giga Bokeria 
and the chief the Rustavi-2 television associated with UNM Nika Gvaramia, 
Saakashvili reportedly encouraged the two politicians to resist the govern-
ment, should it try to seize the television’s buildings. The recordings were 
published by one of Ukraine’s internet portals.
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said that the United National Movement was a “criminal organi-
sation” for which there should be no place in Georgian politics, 
further added to the tension.
Georgian Dream has also taken measures to limit the independ-
ence of the media. In 2012, entrepreneurs with links to the gov-
ernment took over control of the the Imedi television, and in 2014 
the Maestro network found itself in a similar situation. In August 
2015, facing pressure from the government, Imedi stopped broad-
casting popular political debates which also included opposition 
representatives. However, the most widely commented case con-
cerned the Rustavi-2 television station associated with UNM, 
which the government took over control in the aftermath of a po-
litically-motivated lawsuit (August–November 2015).23
2. Symptoms of the pro-western course slipping into 
crisis
2.1. Foreign policy adjustment under Georgian Dream
The Georgian Dream coalition has continued the pro-Western for-
eign policy, although, as far as relations with Russia are concerned, 
its policy has been different from that pursued by Saakashvili. It 
is a priority for the government to normalise relations with Rus-
sia and not provoke Moscow, irrespective of the hostile actions it 
takes. Tbilisi has been trying not to raise the Abkhazia and South 
Ossetian issues on its own initiative, and has responded with rou-
tine protests only to Russia’s provocations (such as Moscow’s signa-
ture of alliance treaties with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali in the years 
23 In August 2015 the television’s former owner Kibar Khalvashi, an entrepre-
neur with links to the Georgian Dream, filed a lawsuit demanding the 2006 
sale transaction to be nullified and the television’s assets sold at that time to 
be returned, claiming that president Saakashvili had forced him to sell them 
at reduced prices. The court granted his request, nullified the transaction and 
at the same time ordered the television chief Nika Gvaramia to be dismissed. 
The ruling attracted international criticism and several days later the court 
repealed the decision concerning the chief and restored Gvaramia to his post.
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2012–2015 or the construction of abatis and the frequent moving of 
border posts at the administrative border of South Ossetia).24 The 
Georgian government has also been very circumspect as far as 
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is concerned.25 While Georgia and 
Russia still have not resumed their diplomatic relations broken in 
2008, they have been involved in political dialogue at the level of 
special envoys, commenced in December 2012 (where Georgia is 
represented by its prime minister Zurab Abashidze and Russia by 
its deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin). The dialogue has al-
ready produced some tangible results, for instance direct flights 
between Russia and Georgia have resumed, Moscow has lifted its 
embargo on imports from Georgia, and has promised to liberal-
ise the visa regime for Georgian nationals. The United National 
Movement has criticised the dialogue, claiming that it amounted 
to capitulation by Georgian Dream, and has pointed out that the 
restoration of Russian-Georgian relations mainly benefited Mos-
cow as it served to make Georgia dependent on Russia once more.26
The increasing co-operation with Russia in such sensitive areas as 
energy and transport has also been a source of domestic concern. 
A daughter company of Russia’s Rosneft has acquired a 49% stake 
in the Poti sea port (the stake was sold by a private company but 
24 The moving of the border is a major problem for the local population, and es-
pecially farmers who have fields on both sides of the border. Russian soldiers 
and members of Ossetian armed groups often detain inhabitants of Georgian 
villages in the border zone, who then end up in prison in Tskhinvali (and the 
EUMM then mediates their release).
25 One of the reasons is that many members of the Saakashvili team are now 
involved in Ukraine as officials or advisers to the Ukrainian government. 
26 Wine exports may serve as an example of this mechanism. After Russia im-
posed an embargo on Georgian products, Georgia successfully managed to re-
orientate its exports (it started selling mainly to the EU). When the Russian 
ban on imports was lifted, the situation reverted to the pre-2006 status. As 
a result, as of 2013 Russia was the destination for 50% for Georgia’s entire wine 
exports and was the fifth largest recipient of Georgian exports in general (up 
from position 11 in 2012). In the aftermath of the recession in Russia in 2015, 
Georgian exports to the Russian Federation decreased by 47.1% in the first 
9 months of the year.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
2/
20
16
27
the government could have blocked the transaction27), negotia-
tions with Russia’s Gazprom have been underway since October 
2015 concerning the possibility for Georgia to start buying Russian 
gas,28 and Tbilisi has been sending unclear signals concerning the 
possible unblocking of the railway line from Russia via Abkhazia 
to Tbilisi and Yerevan, which has been closed since 1992.29
The lifting of the restrictions on Russian television broadcasting, 
which had been in place since 2008, was a friendly gesture to Rus-
sia, which at the same time did not serve the pro-Western option 
because it opened new possibilities for Russian propaganda. The 
Georgian secret services have also been less active and mass sur-
veillance less widespread, which has produced a similar effect: 
while it broadened civil liberties, it made it easier for the pro-Rus-
sian groups in Georgia to act and co-operate with the Russian side.
Some members of the ruling team have been sending contradicto-
ry signals concerning the possibility of a radical re-orientation of 
Georgia’s foreign policy. While he was still prime minister, Ivan-
ishvili said for instance that he would not rule out the option of 
Georgia joining the Eurasian Economic Union, and foreign min-
ister Giorgi Kvirikashvili (prime minister since December 2015) 
argued in September 2015 that it was necessary to intensify co-
operation with partners in the “Eurasian continent” and diver-
sify Georgia’s foreign policy. Zurab Abashidze’s statement to the 
27 For more information, see: Marek Matusiak, Rosneft to invest in Georgia, 
OSW Analyses; http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-01-14/
rosneft-to-invest-georgia
28 Public opinion was surprised by the meetings between the energy minister 
Kakha Kaladze and the Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller. The government said 
that the two parties were negotiating terms of the transit of Russian gas to 
Armenia and the possibility of barter settlements (in the form of gas sup-
plies). However, in one of his interviews Ivanishvili said that Georgia was 
too heavily dependent on gas from Azerbaijan, and diversification of supplies 
would be beneficial.
29 http://publicdialogues.info/en/Paata%20Zakareishvili%3A%20The%20
New%20Government%20of%20Georgia%20is%20a%20Chance%20for%20
Russia%20to%20Normalize%20Its%20Relations%20with%20Georgia
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effect that Georgia’s signature of the Association Agreement with 
the European Union had been done in consultation with Russia 
also led to some embarrassment,30 and there are politicians in the 
government coalition (e.g. Gogi Topadze, the leader of the Party 
of Industrialists) who are quite open about their pro-Russian and 
anti-Western views.31
From the point of view of foreign policy, it was symptomatic and 
significant when the Georgian Dream leadership provoked the 
Free Democrats party of Irakli Alasania to quit the government 
coalition (November 2014). Members of the Free Democrats held 
the posts of foreign minister (Maia Panjikidze), minister for Eu-
ropean integration (Alexi Petriashvili) and defence minister (Ala-
sania). Thus, the party was in fact in charge of the Euro-Atlantic 
policy and was trusted by partners in the West, and its exit from 
the government coalition was perceived as a worrying signal with 
regard to the future direction of Tbilisi’s foreign policy.32
It appears that underlying Georgian Dream’s conciliatory policy 
towards Russia is political realism, i.e. the belief that it is neces-
sary to build proper relations with the northern neighbour. It is 
more important, however, that Ivanishvili’s party wishes to be 
seen as an antithesis of the (ostensibly anti-Russian) Saakashvili’s 
30 http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=618198
31 http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43672&tx_
ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=108b0483c8232c18eb533a928f b748cc#.
VioYp37hDcs
32 Their exit from the coalition was preceded by detentions and accusations of 
corruption against some high-ranking officials and officers at the Ministry 
of Defence and the General Staff, voiced during Alasania’s tour of European 
states. An additional element in the scandal, which casts doubt on the Geor-
gian Dream’s pro-Western stance, concerns the fact that the government 
withdrew Alasania’s authorisation to conclude a deal with the French side 
for the purchase of an air and tank defence system. The minister nonetheless 
signed the agreement, and upon his return announced that the Free Demo-
crats were leaving the coalition. See e.g. http://www.the-american-interest.
com/2014/11/13/is-georgia-slipping-away/; http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.
php?id=27751
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regime both in internal policy, and in the external dimension (it 
is the paradigm on which Ivanishvili has built his party’s politi-
cal programme). This policy has been criticised by the pro-West-
ern opposition, whose members have accused the government of 
political naiveté in relations with Russia, and has given rise to 
suspicions about Georgian Dream’s real intentions (is it covertly 
pro-Russian, or maybe even acting on orders from Moscow?). In 
this context people have been calling into doubt the unclear and 
ambiguous political views, the Russian past and links to Russia 
of Bidzina Ivanishvili, the governing camp’s informal leader, who 
made a fortune in Russia in the 1990s and 2000s.33 His opponents 
have pointed out that Ivanishvili knows little about the West, does 
not understand it and has no extensive contacts there. At the same 
time he knows very well how Russian politics and business work, 
has many contacts in the Russian elite, and the Russian mentality 
and perception of the world are closer to him than the Western 
approach. He may therefore be more susceptible to Russian influ-
ence. In the wider public, it is even commonly believed that Ivan-
ishvili is “Moscow’s man”. 
2.2. Stagnating reforms
The Ivanishvili camp has not abandoned the programme of mod-
ernisation reforms, but its implementation has been stagnating. 
Moreover, many reforms have been implemented in the legislative 
dimension only, and have had little impact on reality. Saakash-
vili’s team had a clearly defined and bold (even if often controver-
sial and grandiose) vision of how to transform the country, which 
was widely publicised at home and abroad. His program of revo-
lutionary reforms was implemented energetically by a strongly 
motivated, well-integrated team convinced that it had a historical 
mission to accomplish and was led by a charismatic leader. Geor-
gian Dream’s internal policy lacks such characteristics. It is inert, 
33 See e.g. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23761199.2013.11417276
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unenthusiastic and lacks clarity as to the direction in which the 
country should be heading.
Georgia has been experiencing certain worrying tendencies, 
some of which could be interpreted as symptoms of the country 
regressing in areas in which improvement was achieved during 
Saakashvili’s rule: i.e. cases of corruption and nepotism in the 
lower ranks of power,34 or mass dismissals of officials and func-
tionaries hired before 2012 and re-hiring of those who lost their 
positions as part of the fight against corruption in the wake of the 
Rose Revolution. Levels of common crime have also increased, 
mainly as a result of the 2013 amnesty under which 17 thousand 
people, i.e. three quarters of all inmates, were released from pris-
ons, and softer prison regimes, including in relation to the mafia 
organisations.35 According to some sources, the government has 
also begun to support the creation of organisations (mostly youth 
organisations, such as the Free Generation) and informal group-
ings of retired enforcement functionaries, former members of 
paramilitary formations of former prison inmates and criminals. 
These groups have been used in various political ploys against the 
opposition.36
34 In a poll conducted in February 2015 by the International Republican Institute 
35% of respondents said that with regard to corruption, the situation had de-
teriorated, while 15% said it had improved; http://www.iri.org/sites/default/
files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_final_0.pdf
35 As a result of which the imprisoned mafia bosses (vory v zakone in Russian) 
re-established contacts with criminals at large and were able to lead mafia 
groups again; http://ru.rfi.fr/kavkaz/20140920-v-gruzii-sporyat-o-tom-kto-
vinovat-v-roste-prestupnosti. As many as 62% of respondents in the Interna-
tional Republican Institute poll of February 2015 said that the crime situation 
had deteriorated while only 11% believed it had improved); http://www.iri.
org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_final_0.pdf. A poll 
conducted by NDI in April 2015 delivered similar results with 48% of respond-
ents saying that crime levels had increased and 6% – that it had fallen; htt-
ps://www.ndi.org/files/NDI%20Georgia_April%202015%20Poll_Public%20
Issues_ENG_VF_0.pdf
36 For instance, the Mkhedrioni formation, which operated in the early 1990s 
and was involved in the civil war in Georgia and the war in Abkhazia; http://
www.apsny.ge/analytics/1444883122.php
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2.3. Rising conservative sentiments and growing tensions
During Georgian Dream’s rule the Georgian Orthodox Church, 
which has always held strong sway in Georgia, gained even more 
influence over politics and public opinion, especially among the 
most conservative sections of society.37 One of the underlying 
causes concerns the difference between Saakashvili’s and Ivan-
ishvili’s perception of the Church. The latter, despite describing 
himself as an atheist, maintains close links to the Church, shares 
its views on many issues and considers it to be the government’s 
ally (as does Vladimir Putin in Russia). The Church, kept away 
from politics under Saakashvili, now also enjoys much more au-
tonomy and freedom to come up with its own social and political 
initiatives. The Orthodox Church officially supports Georgia’s 
pro-Western aspirations but in practice many in the clergy see 
the West and its liberal values as a threat to Georgian identity, 
cherishing and emphasising a religious and civilizational prox-
imity to the Russian Orthodox Church, with which the Georgian 
Church maintains close relations. Patriarch Ilia II, who enjoys 
great authority in Georgia,38 has repeatedly called for reconcili-
ation with Russia. Representatives of the Church and numer-
ous Orthodox organisations and communities are very active in 
public life, and hold much sway over the public (the patriarch 
himself is commonly regarded as the most authoritative fig-
ure in Georgia).39 These groups thus have a major influence on 
public opinion, which often adversely affects Georgia’s attitude 
37 The proposal put forward by patriarch Ilia II for a legal bill that would grant 
the Georgian Orthodox Church the authority to pardon convicted individuals 
(December 2015) is a symptomatic example of the Orthodox Church’s rising 
influence. The patriarch has since withdrawn the proposal, which the prime 
minister nonetheless considered to be a good idea.
38 See e.g.: http://www.interfax-religion.ru/gry/?act=news&div=60240
39 The Orthodox Church is the most trusted institution in Georgia. As many as 
91% of respondents in a February 2015 poll by the International Republican 
Institute held positive views of the Church’s activities; http://www.iri.org/
sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_final_0.pdf; the other 
most trusted institutions included the army, the media and the police.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
2/
20
16
32
towards the West. In many situations (especially when it comes 
to reducing Western values to the defence of sexual minority 
rights) the Church may in fact be seen as an instrument of Rus-
sian propaganda.40 
The Church and the conservative Orthodox communities have 
been gaining more and more influence in parallel with the rise 
of nationalist sentiments and intolerance towards other religions 
and sexual minorities, especially among the younger generation. 
This trend has led to several widely commented cases of religious 
conflicts (especially Orthodox-Muslim) in local communities, 
mostly in western Georgia (Ajaria, Guria, Samtskhe-Javakheti)41. 
Another striking incident concerned the use of violence against 
a small demonstration of LGBT activists by defenders of tradition-
al values taking part in a counter-demonstration led by Orthodox 
clergymen, which brought together several tens of thousand peo-
ple (May 2013)42. The radicalisation of Muslim youths (especially 
in the Chechen-populated Pankisi Gorge) is also a major problem, 
as a result of which local conflicts have been exacerbated and 
many young people have left for Syria to join the jihad (between 
50 to 200 Georgian nationals are believed to be currently fighting 
in Syria, mostly of Chechen origin). The latter problem, however, 
is related not so much to the internal situation in Georgia, as to 
the developments in the Middle East and the difficult economic 
situation in Pankisi.43 Still, it is a fact that during UNM’s rule, the 
40 For instance, European liberal values were much criticised on the occasion 
of the heated debate over the adoption of a highly contested anti-discrim-
ination bill, which Georgia was required to enact prior to the signature of 
the Association Agreement with the EU; http://humanrightshouse.org/Ar-
ticles/20133.html
41 For example, the conflicts in Kobuleti (over the construction of a madrassa), 
in the Chelo villages in Ajaria (where people protested against the construc-
tion of a minaret) or in Adigeni in Samtskhe-Javakheti (a conflict over the 
construction of a mosque).
42 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22565723
43 For more information, see: Maciej Falkowski, Józef Lang, Homo Jihadicus: 
Islam in the former USSR and the phenomenon of the post-Soviet militants in 
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state reacted to such phenomena much more decisively in order to 
prevent them from escalating.
2.4. Growing influence of pro-Russian groups 
The recently stepped up activity of pro-Russian communities, in-
cluding both old and new organisations and political parties, is 
a new phenomenon in Georgia. The pro-Russian community in-
cludes:
 – political parties (e.g. the Democratic Movement – United Geor-
gia of Nino Burjanadze, the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia led 
by David Tarkhan-Mouravi, the Labour Party of Shalva Nate-
lashvili, and Free Georgia of Kakha Kukava);
 – non-governmental organisations (e.g. the Eurasian Choice of 
Georgia of Archil Chkoidze and the Eurasian Institute of Gul-
baat Rtskhiladze);
 – the media (e.g. Sputnik Georgia or Georgia and the World).44
Many of them operate under the Eurasian identity, in line with 
the priorities and the propaganda tone of Russia’s reintegration 
strategy for the post-Soviet area. They call for a break with the 
West and want the Euro-Atlantic aspirations to be scrapped and 
relations with Russia to be normalised. In some cases they even 
argue that Georgia should be incorporated into the Kremlin’s in-
tegration projects. 
The pro-Russian parties and organisations have been very active 
in the media, they have organised research and press conferenc-
es, demonstrations, and have conducted their own public opinion 
Syria and Iraq, OSW Report, September 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/
default/files/homojihadicus.pdf
44 http://sputnik-georgia.ru/; http://www.geworld.ge
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polls.45 According to some sources, their representatives have been 
travelling around the country, telling people that association with 
the EU would have negative consequences for Georgian society.46 
They have also been promoting the view that Georgia could regain 
control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in return for entering the 
Russian sphere of influence.47 Russian support for these organi-
sations, in the form of financial and media assistance, has been 
rather discreet. The Democratic Movement is the only exception, 
as its leader Nino Burjanadze frequently travels to Moscow and 
meets high-ranking Russian politicians.48
The pro-Russian community is fragmented, internally divided 
and ridden by conflicts (for instance over the funding from Rus-
sia). While its influence should not be overestimated, it has none-
theless become an audible voice in Georgia’s political life, while 
during the UNM’s rule the pro-Russian option was marginal and 
barely noticeable. In the 2013 presidential election, Nino Bur-
janadze garnered 10% of the vote, and the result of her party in 
the 2014 local elections was similar (with the Alliance of Patri-
ots of Georgia gaining 4.7%). In most recent polls, total support 
for the pro-Russian parties ranges between 12% and 16%, which 
means they could make it into parliament.49 The fact that a mas-
45 For example, the Eurasian Institute has conducted a poll which showed that 
only 32% of Georgians supported integration with NATO, while as many as 
40% were against; http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/articles/U-gruzin-net-ne-
priyazni-k-Rossii.html
46 http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1915893.html#ixzz3Y8Itpoej
47 See e.g.: http://sputnik-georgia.ru/politics/20151219/229528650.html
48 In July 2015 Burjanadze met with the Russian Duma speaker Sergei Nary-
shkin and the Russian deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin, among oth-
ers; http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28423
49 According to a February 2015 poll by the International Republican Institute 
the Labour Party could expect to gain 6% of the vote, while the Alliance of 
Patriots and Nino Burjanadze’s group could get 5% each; http://www.iri.org/
sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_final_0.pdf; a poll con-
ducted by the National Democratic Institute in August 2015 showed 5% of 
support for the Alliance of Patriots, 4% for the Labour Party and 3% for Bur-
janadze’s party; https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_August_2015_Survey_pub-
lic%20Political_ENG_vf.pdf
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sive majority of people in Georgia have no clear political prefer-
ences expands their room for manoeuvre. This situation may lead 
to a fragmented parliament after the elections due to take place in 
autumn 2016 and force the main political forces to co-operate with 
the pro-Russian groups and take their views on foreign policy into 
account.50
While the pro-Russian groups have been increasingly active, a no-
ticeable albeit slow spread of pro-Russian sentiments may be ob-
served among the general public. Supporters of the pro-Western 
option were shocked by the results of an opinion poll conducted by 
the US National Democracy Institute in April 2015, which showed 
that as many as 31% of respondents were for Georgia entering the 
Eurasian Union (with 41% against; in previous polls conducted in 
April and August 2014 the Eurasian option was backed by 16% and 
20% of respondents, respectively, and in later polls from August 
and November 2015 – 28% and 24%, respectively)51. The number of 
people who believe that Georgia would gain more if it rejected the 
Euro-Atlantic foreign policy vector and normalised relations with 
Russian instead of pursuing European integration has also been 
increasing: in April 2014 this view was shared by 20% of respond-
ents, compared to 30% in August 2015.52 Moreover, while a deci-
sive majority (around 80%) of Georgians consider Russia to be 
a threat, believe that Russia has a negative influence on Georgia 
50 The results of by-elections that took place in October 2015 in the single-man-
date constituency of Sagarejo (eastern Georgia) may suggest that pro-Russian 
groups could get good showings in the parliamentary elections to be held 
in autumn 2016. It was held because the Sagarejo deputy Tina Khidasheli 
was appointed minister for defence, and had to resign from her seat in par-
liament. The Georgian Dream candidate Tamar Khidasheli (the minister’s 
relative) garnered 49% of the vote, while the Patriots’ Alliance candidate 
Irma Inashvili, who campaigned under anti-Western slogans, came in with 
a showing of 45%. The remaining political groups had boycotted the ballot; 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28728
51 https://www.ndi.org/georgia-polls
52 https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_August_2015%20survey_Public%20Issues_
ENG_VF.pdf
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or side with Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict,53 they are 
also overwhelmingly for the normalisation of relations with Rus-
sia and support the government’s steps in this direction.
3. causes of the crisis
3.1. Internal political crisis
One of the causes of the crisis of Georgia’s pro-Western course 
concerns a multidimensional, deepening internal political crisis. 
Its elements include the opaque political system created by Geor-
gian Dream, the ruling party’s lack of vision for the country, and 
a deep decline in the public’s confidence in the political class.
Georgia’s key figure is the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, the found-
er and sponsor of the Georgian Dream movement. Even though he 
does not hold any official function, he is the  éminence grise of Geor-
gian politics, taking key decisions and steering the government 
from behind the scenes. He also supervises the activities of high-
ranking state officials, including president Margvelashvili, whom 
he often reprimands. As a result, the decision-making process in 
Georgia is opaque and politicians holding top posts (including the 
former prime minister Irakli Garibashvili and the current head of 
government Giorgi Kvirikashvili) are de facto figureheads. At the 
same time, Ivanishvili can hardly be described as charismatic, 
and the fact that he does not hold any official position makes him 
politically unaccountable. 
It has also been increasingly clear that the Georgian Dream coali-
tion is internally divided. In November 2014, the Free Democrats 
53 In April 2014, 62% of Georgians believed that Russia was responsible for the 
Crimea crisis (while 15% said it had been Ukraine’s fault), and 66% condemned 
the annexation of Crimea, although only 46% believed that the Georgian gov-
ernment should take any action in support of Ukraine other than verbal pro-
test; https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Georgia_August-2014-survey_Public-
Issues_ENG_vf.pdf
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
2/
20
16
37
quit the coalition, and a conflict surfaced between, on the one 
hand, Ivanishvili and his protégé, the then prime minister Gari-
bashvili, and on the other, the president, who in many situations 
had distanced himself from the Georgian Dream leaders and 
criticised them openly. The fact that the coalition lacks internal 
cohesion and consensus as far as foreign policy is concerned is 
also visible in the openly anti-Western statements by some politi-
cians (e.g. the leaders of Party of Industrialists – Gogi Topadze and 
Zurab Tkemaladze) and in the tense relations with one of the coa-
lition members, the Republican Party of David Usupashvili (the 
parliament speaker) and the leadership of Georgian Dream.
Moreover, the ruling group has no clear vision of the country’s 
future course and individual politicians do not seem to be guided 
by any particular political ideology; this also applies to Ivanish-
vili who has never articulated his political views. President Giorgi 
Margvelashvili, who strives to preserve the independence of the 
president’s office and act as a guardian of democratic principles 
and the country’s pro-Western foreign policy course, is the only 
exception here. However, as he has no political camp of his own, 
his position is weak.
The Georgian party system is also in crisis. Created ad hoc in the 
run-up to the 2012 parliamentary elections and individually con-
trolled by Ivanishvili, the Georgian Dream movement has not 
developed into a full-fledged political party with central and re-
gional structures, a clear political programme, leaders, etc. The 
United National Movement, too, has been undergoing a crisis in 
its programme and personnel, and since December 2015 has been 
led by a collective body (Saakashvili had to resign as party leader 
after he was stripped of Georgian citizenship). However, despite 
having quit his post, Saakashvili is still trying to control his party 
remotely, which has been generating internal conflicts. 
The crisis of the political scene is reflected in public opinion polls. 
According to a poll conducted by NDI in October 2015, as many 
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as 60% of respondents could not name a party for which they 
would be willing to vote. Meanwhile, the government’s dwindling 
popularity has not yet translated into better showings by the op-
position: only 16% of respondents said they supported Georgian 
Dream (down from 24% in April 2015 and 54.9% in 2012 parliamen-
tary elections), and only 10% supported UNM (down from 15% and 
40%, respectively).54 The pro-Russian parties are the only ones 
to have reported a slight improvement in their showing. The un-
precedented decline of trust in political parties and the fact that 
people do not feel represented by them are indicative of a deep cri-
sis of confidence in the political class. This situation opens new 
opportunities for populist groups and leaders who may emerge 
and disrupt the Georgian political scene ahead of the 2016 parlia-
mentary elections.
3.2. Economic problems and social apathy
Despite the country’s economic success after 2003 (which Geor-
gia owes to reforms, the fact that it effectively restored the state’s 
functionality, introduced a liberal economic package and managed 
to attract foreign direct investments) neither UNM nor Georgian 
Dream have been able to resolve the country’s chronic economic 
and social woes. The most important problems concern persistent 
high unemployment of around 15% overall and as as much as 30% 
in the young generation,55 as well as low wages (the average wage 
in 2014 was GEL 818, i.e. around US$ 340). The structure of employ-
ment is also a major problem, with 53% of the population working 
in agriculture, which accounts for a mere 10% of GDP. Remittances 
from migrant workers abroad continue to play an important role 
54 https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Winter%20poll_2015_Public%20presenta-
tion_ENG_version%20FINAL_0.pdf
55 Real unemployment is higher because all rural inhabitants who own land are 
automatically considered to be employed, which is often not the case. Opinion 
polls are also symptomatic in this respect: a majority of respondents (more 
than 60%) consider themselves to be “unemployed”, which may suggest that 
they have no permanent jobs; https://www.ndi.org/georgia-polls
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in the economy, accounting for 12% of GDP.56 More than 14% of 
Georgia’s population live below the poverty line and the majority 
have experienced no improvement in their standards of living (or 
have even reported worse living conditions in recent months57), 
even though Georgia’s per capita income has been slowly rising 
(from US$ 1763 in 2006 to US$ 3676 in 2014). However, wealth is not 
distributed evenly. Huge emigration numbers testify to the dif-
ficult economic situation of the Georgians: according to the latest 
census, Georgia’s population has shrunk from 4.4 million in 2002 
to 3.7 million in 2014, (by 14.7%), mainly as a result of emigration 
(and the population of rural areas has shrunk even more, by more 
than 23.8%).58
Moreover, in 2015 Georgia’s economic performance started dete-
riorating. GDP increased by a mere 2.5% according to preliminary 
estimates and the volume of trade decreased by 13% year on year, 
with trade exchange with the Commonwealth of Independent 
States declining by as much as 22% in the first nine months. Ex-
ports dropped by 23% in 2015, with exports to the CIS down by 44% 
(by 47.1% to Russia and by 53.2% to Azerbaijan in the first three 
quarters). Meanwhile, imports declined by 10% and remittances 
from Georgians working abroad fell by 25% (by 39% in the case of 
Russia, which accounts for around 40% of total remittances). The 
influx of foreign direct investments has also been slower: in the 
third quarter of 2015 FDI amounted to US$ 1.019 million, a decline 
of 17.2% year on year. Georgia has also been downgraded in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business ranking (albeit it still ranks quite 
high): it ranked 8th in 2013, 15th in 2014 and 24th in 2015.
56 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS
57 In a poll conducted by the NDI in August 2015, 43% of respondents said that 
their living conditions had deteriorated in the preceding year (9% reported 
an improvement and 47% said there had been no change); https://www.ndi.
org/files/NDI_August_2015%20survey_Public%20Issues_ENG_VF.pdf
58 http://www.geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/english/population/Accord-
ing%20to%20preliminary%20results%20of%20the%202014%20popula-
tion%20census%20Final.pdf
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The depreciation of the Georgian lari, which has been underway 
since November 2014, has also been an important economic and 
social issue, caused by low oil prices in global markets and the 
recession or economic difficulties experienced by Georgia’s main 
trading partners (the Georgian currency lost 28.3% against the 
dollar in 2015). This is a major internal problem that has been af-
fecting nearly everyone in Georgia as people’s purchasing power 
has decreased due to more expensive imports and the fact that the 
economy is strongly tied to the dollar. The depreciation of the lari 
has in turn triggered faster inflation – the inflation rate year on 
year was 4.9% in 2015, compared to 3.1% in 2015.
Both the United National Movement and Georgian Dream have 
been criticised for their economic policies. Saakashvili has been 
accused of making the economy excessively dependent on foreign 
investments, assistance and loans, which did little to increase 
employment. He has been criticised for undertaking many costly 
investments that were pointless from an economic point of view 
(and moreover, were not carried out by Georgian companies but 
rather by foreign, mostly Turkish, construction contractors). 
It has also been argued that the liberalisation mainly benefited 
large companies rather than small family businesses. Critics of 
Ivanishvili’s economic policy, on the other hand, have been point-
ing out that his rectification of some of the liberal solutions adopt-
ed after 2003 (e.g. the labour code amendment, the ban on land 
sale to foreign operators and a more restrictive visa policy) have 
hit entrepreneurs and discouraged investors, thus slowing down 
economic development. The government has also been accused of 
increasing social spending via populist measures. 
However, the main source of Georgia’s economic problems should 
not be located in the mistakes made by this or the previous gov-
ernment (the economic policies of both have been similar despite 
some differences). The root of the problems lies in objective limi-
tations and chronic internal problems, i.e. primarily the conse-
quences of the economic collapse that followed the break-up of the 
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USSR, a small internal market, public poverty, as well as external 
factors beyond the government’s control, such as the global finan-
cial crisis, a deteriorating situation in global markets or the reces-
sion in Russia (which was one of the main causes of the problems 
in 2015). Starting from 2014, the Georgian economy has also been 
adversely affected by some of the short-term effects of the DCFTA 
concluded with the EU (the need to adopt a number of EU regula-
tions, e.g. labour legislation, or the increase in electricity prices 
for households), which may yield a positive effect on Georgia’s eco-
nomic situation only in the longer term.
Nonetheless, the economic difficulties have directly influenced 
perceptions within society, both in the domestic dimension (Geor-
gian Dream’s waning popularity), and with regard to external re-
lations. Georgians expect the rapprochement with the West, and 
especially with the European Union, to lead to an improvement of 
their standards of living, as the success of the initial years of re-
forms has kindled a hope that things would improve. The absence 
of a positive change thus breeds Eurosceptic sentiments: between 
April 2014 and August 2015 the percentage of people who believed 
that Georgia would gain more from European integration than 
it would from quitting the pro-Western course decreased from 
nearly 60% to 45%.59
Alongside the negative tendencies in politics and the economy, 
pessimism and social apathy have been growing in Georgia, as 
clearly evidenced by public opinion polls. In November 2015 as 
many as 44% of respondents said that Georgia was heading in the 
wrong direction, 18% said it was going in the right direction, and 
31% – that the situation appeared unchanged60 (back in August 
2014 the proportions were almost the reverse, and in November 
59 https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_August_2015%20survey_Public%20Issues_
ENG_VF.pdf
60 https://www.ndi.org/files/NDI_Winter%20poll_2015_Public%20presenta-
tion_ENG_version%20FINAL_0.pdf
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2013, 53% of respondents believed that the country was heading 
in the right direction, 9% thought it was going in the wrong direc-
tion, and 28% said they were not seeing any change61). Respond-
ents in a February 2015 poll by the International Republican Insti-
tute were equally pessimistic (55% on the pessimist side, with 25% 
on the optimist side)62.
3.3. Disenchantment with the West
The causes of the Georgian crisis should not be located only in un-
favourable internal dynamics. The international context in which 
Georgia has found itself is also significant and it is not the same as 
it was several years ago.
Under Saakashvili, and especially during his first term, Georgia 
as well as the other post-Soviet states, and even some Central 
Asian countries, were at the centre of attention of the West, i.e. 
especially the United States and, to a lesser extent, the European 
Union. The increased Western involvement was related to a num-
ber of factors including the series of pro-Western revolutions in 
these countries (which started with the events in Georgia in 2003) 
and the hopes that the post-Soviet states would quickly transform 
and democratise, and that it would be possible to export Azeri and 
Central Asian energy resources to Europe while bypassing Rus-
sia. The Western involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq was also 
important in this regard (the Caucasus was then seen as an im-
portant transport corridor), as was the relatively weak and less 
assertive Russian policy in this area. Western support and sym-
pathy, which the Georgians could clearly see, plus the US and EU 
assistance visible everywhere and the EU’s declarations about 
Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic prospects, together with the positive and 
61 https://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Public-Attitudes-Poll-121813-ENG.pdf
62 http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_public_2015_fi-
nal_0.pdf. In November 2012 (immediately after the parliamentary elections) 
63% were optimistic and only 12% were pessimistic. 
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noticeable effects of Saakashvili’s reforms, all translated into 
massive enthusiasm for the West, which the Georgians commonly 
idealised.
This situation started to change with the onset of the war in 2008. 
The Georgians were disappointed by the fact that the United 
States did not back them militarily in the face of Russian aggres-
sion. Over time – and owing in no small extent to open declara-
tions by Western politicians who dispelled any illusions that the 
Georgians could hold in this respect63 – Georgians also started 
to realise that integration with NATO and the European Union 
would not happen in the foreseeable future and that co-operation 
with the Alliance would not lead to Georgia regaining control of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (while the 2008 NATO summit in Bu-
charest did declare that the path to membership could hypotheti-
cally be open to Georgia, the country has still not been granted its 
MAP, i.e. Membership Action Plan). The government has repre-
sented the signature of the Association Agreement and the DCFTA 
as a success and a step towards Europe, but the public at large do 
not understand the idea of the Eastern Partnership. The Geor-
gians felt disappointed when it turned out that participation in 
the Eastern Partnership did not mean automatic abolition of vi-
sas and accession to the European Union. Contrary to their initial 
hopes, Georgians, who unwittingly applied Soviet and Russian 
clichés to the West, had to realise that the Eastern Partnership 
was not a geopolitical project aimed mainly at building a Euro-
pean sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union and entering 
into a rivalry with Russia. At the same time, the West noticeably 
lost interest in Georgia as it became focused on its own internal 
problems such as the financial crisis, the Greek problem, the mi-
gration crisis, the situation in the Middle East and, in the case of 
the United States, also the Pacific region. 
63 For example, the statement by the US President Barack Obama who said in 
March 2014 that Georgia and Ukraine were not on path to NATO membership.
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The image of the West in the eyes of Georgians has also been dete-
riorating due to a conflict of values: liberal European values ver-
sus conservative Georgian values. This conflict is not only a prod-
uct of successful Russian propaganda which reduces the choice 
between the West and Russia to an alleged choice between ex-
treme liberalism and so-called traditional values, but also the fact 
that the Western states and organisations have put socially sensi-
tive issues (such as sexual minority rights) high on the agenda of 
their relations with Georgia. The Georgian people have also strug-
gled to understand why most official European actors distanced 
themselves from their Christian heritage, which Georgians see 
as a foundation of European identity, and they get irritated when 
further assistance to Georgia is offered on the condition that 
Georgians themselves accept such liberal values.
As a result, the West has been gradually de-mythologised in Geor-
gia and people have become disenchanted with its policy, which 
many of them regard as political ingratitude: Georgia has sacri-
ficed Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the name of integration with 
the West, vexed its relations with Russia, sent thousand of troops 
to Iraq and Afghanistan64 and met the conditions set by the EU, 
but in return it has obtained neither security guarantees nor 
membership prospects or a promise of regaining control of the 
breakaway provinces, or universal prosperity – all that it got is 
a promise of visa abolition and vaguely conceivable future bene-
fits from the DCFTA. The growing disenchantment with the West 
is reflected in public opinion polls: between November 2013 and 
August 2015, the number of people supporting integration with 
the EU decreased from 85% to 61% (while the number of opponents 
increased from 10% to 21%), while the percentage of those support-
ing integration with NATO dropped from 81% to 69%.65 
64 In Iraq, 3 Georgian soldiers have died, and 31 have been killed in Afghanistan 
(the largest single loss of life was the death of 7 troops in a suicide bomb attack 
in June 2013).
65 https://www.ndi.org/files/Georgia-Public-Attitudes-Poll-121813-ENG.pdf; https://
www.ndi.org/files/NDI_August_2015%20survey_Public%20Issues_ENG_VF.pdf
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3.4. The Russian alternative
In this context, the notion that Georgia made a mistake by openly 
confronting Russia, with which it should instead have developed 
proper relations, has become increasingly popular. This idea was 
first introduced into public discourse by Georgian Dream back 
in 2012, and contributed to that group’s surge in opinion polls 
(alongside the accusations of authoritarianism levelled against 
the Saakashvili regime). The change of attitudes towards Russia 
observed in some sections of society (and to a lesser extent also 
among the elite) stems not so much from deeply held ideological 
sympathies with Russia as from a specifically understood pragma-
tism, resignation and a sense that there is no way out from the sit-
uation in which Georgia has found itself. In view of the absence of 
prospects of integration with the West, some sections of the public 
in Georgia have started to regard the confrontation with Russia as 
political adventurism for which Georgia paid more than it gained. 
The perception, shared by most Georgians, of a cultural proxim-
ity with Russia (Orthodoxy, shared history) started to gain more 
prominence in public discourse, strengthened by Georgians’ gen-
erally positive attitude towards Russians as people and the Russian 
culture (despite the majority’s negative view of the Russian state 
and government). Such opinions have enjoyed a positive reception, 
especially among the middle and older generations which remem-
ber the Soviet era with nostalgia and still maintain extensive con-
tacts with Russians or family members living in Russia. Finally, 
an argument that convinces many people, especially in the prov-
inces, concerns the prospect of the economic situation improving 
as a result of Russia’s decision to open its market to Georgian goods 
(agricultural products in the first instance) and the hypothetical 
possibility for Georgians to go to Russia to work (as the European 
Union’s labour market remains closed). 
Those processes have been furthered by the actions taken by Rus-
sia vis-à-vis Georgia and other post-Soviet states with a view to 
rebuilding Russian influence in the area, through a policy of fear, 
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among other measures. On the one hand, Russia has taken ag-
gressive steps such as the annexation of Crimea, the instigation 
of the conflict in Donbas, the threats against Kazakhstan, the de-
velopment of military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the 
deployment of barbed wire fences around the latter, pressure on 
Azerbaijan to join the Eurasian Union, the military intervention 
in Syria, etc. On the other hand, it has been sending a positive 
message referring to cultural proximity and shared conserva-
tive values (presented in opposition to the “rotten” liberalism of 
the West). This message also includes potential economic benefits 
from participation in the huge common market and access to the 
Russian labour market, as well as political benefits (different for 
different countries, with Russia offering Baku a hypothetical pos-
sibility of regaining control of Karabakh, or promising to defend 
Central Asia against the Islamic threat). Both types of actions 
have been accompanied by massive propaganda whose tone has 
been predominantly anti-Western, but also in the case of Geor-
gia anti-Turkish.66 This propaganda relies on Russian and local 
mass media, usually financed and controlled by Moscow, and soft 
power measures such as student exchanges, conferences, cultural 
events, etc.). 
In the case of Georgia, the lifting of the embargo on Georgian goods 
after Georgian Dream’s election victory, the re-opening of direct 
air connections and the visa liberalisation in 2015, combined with 
a pledge to abolish visas altogether, have also played an impor-
tant role, and so has the new positive or neutral attitude towards 
Georgians in Russia (Georgian nationals faced repression from 
Russian state institutions and were depicted in a negative way in 
66 The Russian media and pro-Russian groups in Georgia have been promoting 
the view that a creeping annexation of Ajaria by Turkey is imminent, point-
ing to the region’s ever stronger economic ties with Turkey, the activities of 
Turkish organisations (including religious organisations and charities), and 
the fact that Turks have recently been settling in Batumi, etc. The aim is to 
create a perception that, in view of the Turkish threat, Georgia should turn 
to Russia.
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the media during the Saakashvili period). While apparently con-
tradictory, these two courses of action add up to a coherent and 
understandable message in the post-Soviet area. On the one hand, 
they intensify the sense of helplessness vis-à-vis Russia, and on 
the other – kindle expectations of concrete benefits to be gained 
if the countries concerned enter the Russian sphere of influence 
again. In the case of Georgia, this method seems to be generat-
ing some positive results (the rising pro-Russian sentiments), al-
though Russia’s policy should not be regarded as the main cause of 
the crisis of Georgia’s pro-Western course. It has been secondary 
to Georgia’s internal processes, including political and economic 
problems and stagnating reforms, as well as disillusionment with 
the West.
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IV. ProSPectS for the future
The crisis experienced by Georgia is deep and multidimensional. 
It is not limited to internal political perturbations or social and 
economic problems, but underpinning it there is also a crisis in 
the state’s strategic vision. Its scale is not alarming yet, but the 
tendencies that have been apparent for several years are none-
theless worrying, even if they are not easily discernible to ex-
ternal observers due to their evolutionary and inconspicuous 
nature. 
It seems unlikely that Georgia should suddenly change its pro-
Western course, mainly because pro-Western sentiments are 
still dominant among the elite and the wider society. Moreo-
ver, even though the rise of friendly attitudes towards Russia 
is a fact, its scale is still limited, and the disenchantment with 
the West has not automatically translated into greater popular-
ity of the pro-Russian option. Moscow’s soft power may achieve 
something in Georgia, but it will not be in a position to remove 
the greatest obstacle standing in the way of Russia’s policy (an 
obstacle of Russia’s own making, for that matter), i.e. the the 
question of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The loss of these two 
provinces has been contemporary Georgia’s greatest trauma, 
and, had Moscow not recognised the independence of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, Russia’s chances of dragging Georgia into its 
sphere of influence would now be incomparably greater. Moreo-
ver, if Moscow (or a Georgian government favourably disposed 
towards Russia) took more decisive measures to subjugate Geor-
gia, it would most probably meet a solid wall of resistance. Un-
rest could break out, possibly in the form of a “Georgian Maid-
an”, and the positive capital that Russia has built in Georgia in 
recent years would be wasted. 
As the crisis worsens, Georgia will more probably experience 
a slow de-Europeanisation, sliding deeper into political malaise, 
social apathy and internal fragmentation. In the geopolitical 
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dimension it will likely become a no-man’s land between Europe 
and Russia, a pro-Western country at the level of official decla-
rations but in reality gradually imploding and drifting towards 
the Russian political and civilizational sphere. While a turn to-
wards Moscow is highly unlikely to happen, this situation may 
give Russia more room for manoeuvre in Georgia (by engender-
ing instability, among other factors). This process may accelerate 
if the conflicts in Georgia’s political scene deepen ahead of the 
coming parliamentary elections (autumn 2016), which may lead 
to the emergence of populist groups, make the political strug-
gle more violent or even lead to internal destabilisation. The sce-
nario in which Georgia’s pro-Western stance will slowly erode 
is all the more likely to materialise because the international 
context in which Georgia exists will probably not change. This 
refers mainly to the fact that the West is not prepared to step up 
its involvement in the South Caucasus, enter into a geopolitical 
rivalry with Russia in the post-Soviet area or offer membership 
prospects to the states there. Without relativizing Georgia’s in-
ternal situation (including the significance of the effort made by 
the Georgians and the need to continue the reforms), this con-
text seems to be decisive at this stage as far as future develop-
ments in Georgia are concerned.
Such a debacle of the European project in Georgia, which cannot 
be ruled out, would not simply represent a failure for Georgians. 
Owing to the symbolic importance of Georgia in the post-Soviet 
area, much larger than its actual size and potential, the country’s 
decision to abandon its westward course would negatively impact 
those other countries in a similar situation, especially Ukraine 
and Moldova, and would threaten to undo the already uncertain 
chances of a democratic transition in the area. In the geopoliti-
cal dimension, this would amount to a reversal of the processes 
that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Losing Georgia, 
a country that managed to make a huge civilizational leap under 
the West’s auspices, and the Georgians, who are still one of the 
most enthusiastically pro-Western nations, would be a painful 
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defeat for Europe. It could speed up the European Union’s trans-
formation into an isolated fortress surrounded by unstable ter-
ritories, unable to positively influence its own neighbourhood, 
defensive and afraid of the external world.
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